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Abstract
What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of
the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early
termination of the relationship modify the terms of a full-commitment contract? We study
these questions by considering a dynamic principal-agent model that naturally extends the
classical Holmström-Milgrom setting to include a risk of default whose origin is independent of
the inherent agency problem. We obtain an explicit characterization of the optimal wage along
with the optimal action provided by the agent. The optimal contract is linear by offering both
a fixed share of the output which is similar to the standard shutdown-free Holmström-Milgrom
model and a linear prevention mechanism that is proportional to the random lifetime of the
contract. We then tweak the model to add a possibility for risk mitigation through investment
and study its optimality.
Keywords: Principal-Agent problems, default risk, Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equations.
1 Introduction
Without seeking to oppose public health and economic growth, there is no doubt that the manage-
ment of the Covid crisis had serious consequences on entire sectors of the economy. The first few
months of 2020 will go down in world history as a period of time characterized by massive layoffs,
forced closures of non-essential companies, disruption of cross-border transportation whilst popu-
lations were subject to lockdown and/or social distancing measures and hospitals and the medical
world struggled to get a grasp on the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic. Whilst the immediate priority was
saving lives, decongesting hospitals and preventing the spread of the disease, many extraordinary
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economic support measures were taken to help businesses and individuals stay afloat during these
unprecedented times and in the hope of tempering the economic crisis that would follow. Although
the world has lived through many crises over the past centuries, from several Panics in the 1800s and
the Great Depression of the 1930s to the more recent Financial Crisis of 2008, never before has the
global economy as a whole come to such a standstill due to an external event. Such large shutdown
risks do not only materialize during pandemics but throughout many major other large events. The
massive bushfires that affected Australia towards the end of 2019, temporarily halting agriculture,
construction activity and tourism in some areas of the country are another recent example. As we
begin to see a glimpse of hope for a way out through vaccination, the focus is turning to building
the world of tomorrow with the idea that we must learn to live with such risks. This paper tries
to make its contribution by focusing on a simple microeconomic issue. In a world subject to moral
hazard, how can we agree to an incentive contract whose obligations could be made impossible or
at least very difficult because of the occurrence of a risk of the nature of the Covid19 pandemic?
Including such a shutdown risk-sharing in contracts seems crucial going forward for at least two
reasons. First, it is not certain that public authority will be able to continue to take significant
economic support measures to insure the partners of a contract if the frequency of such global risks
were to increase. On the other hand, the private insurance market does not offer protection against
the risk of a pandemic which makes pooling too difficult. It therefore seems likely that we will have
to turn to an organized form of risk sharing between the contractors.
Economic theory has a well-developed set of tools to analyze incentive and risk-sharing problems
using expected-utility theory. Most of the now abundant literature related to dynamic contracting
through a Principal-Agent model has, so far, mostly been based on continuously governed (eg.
Brownian motion) output-processes. This was the case of the foundational work of Holmström and
Milgrom [12] and many of its many extensions such as those of Schattler and Sung in [20] and [21],
and the more recent contributions of Sannikov in [19], and Cvitanic et al [5] and [6]. However some
relatively recent works have introduced jump processes into continuous time contracting. Biais
et al. were the first to do so in [3] where they study optimal contracting between an insurance
company and a manager whose effort can reduce the occurence of an underlying accident. In a
similar vein, work by Capponi and Frei [4] also used a jump-diffusion driven outcome process in
order to include the possibility for accidents to negatively affect revenue. Here, we extend the
classical Holmström and Milgrom [12] framework to include a shutdown risk. We do not claim
that this model with CARA preferences is general enough to come up with robust economic facts,
but it has the remarkable advantage of being explicitly creditworthy, which allows us to find an
explicit optimal contract that disentangles the incentives from external risk-sharing and allows us
to understand the sensitivity of the optimal contract to the different exogenous parameters of the
model. Our work uses a jump-diffusion process too and presents some structural similarities with
[4] : both models consider a risk averse principal and agent with exponential utility and reach an
explicit characterization of the optimal wage. However, Capponi and Frei combine the continuous
part of the diffusion and the accident jump process additively and they are able to allow prevention
through intensity control of the jump process. This makes sense as many accidents are preventable
through known measures. Our framework uses a different form of jump diffusion to enable the shut-
down event to completely stop revenue generation in a continuous-time setting. This is done by
building on a standard continuous Brownian-motion based output process. The main novelty is the
multiplicative effect of the jump risk : upon the arrival of the risk, the whole of the output process
comes to a halt. As an extension, we allow the halt to no longer be a complete fatality : production
2
may continue at a degraded level through an investment by the principal. From a methodolog-
ical viewpoint, our reasoning uses a now standard method in dynamic contracting based on [19]
and [6] which consists in transforming both the first-best and second-best problems into classical
Markovian control problems. The solution to these control problems can be characterized through
a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Quite remarkably, this equation has, in our context, an ex-
plicit solution that is closely linked to a so-called Bernouilli ODE which facilitates many extensions.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explicitly introduce a default in a dynamic
Principal-agent framework, in both a first-best (also called full Risk-Sharing) and second-best (also
called Moral Hazard) setting. A key feature of our study is that the shape of the optimal contract is
linear. More precisely, the agent’s compensation is the sum of two functions: the first is linear with
respect to the output and serves to give the incentives, while the second is linear with respect to the
effective duration of the contract and serves to share the default risk. While the linear incentive part
of the contract is in line with the existing literature on continuous-time Principal-Agent problems
without default under exponential utilities, the risk-sharing part deserves some clarification. The
contract exposes both agents to a risk of exogenous interruption but it has two different regimes
that are determined by an explicit relation between the risk-aversions and the agent’s effort cost.
Under the first regime, the agent is more sensitive to the risk of default than the principal. In
this case, the principal deposits on the date 0 a positive amount onto an escrow account whose
balance will then decrease over time at a constant rate. It is crucial to observe that the later the
default arrives, the more the amount in the escrow account decreases to a point where it may even
become negative. If the default occurs, the principal transfers the remaining balance to the agent.
Under the second regime, the principal is more sensitive to the risk of default. In this case, the
principal deposits a negative amount into the escrow account, which now grows at a constant rate
and symmetrical reasoning applies. This linearity contrasts with the optimum obtained in [4] as
the additive contribution of their jump process to revenue generation leads to a sub-linear wage.
This result is coherent with the paper by Hoffman and Pfeil [11] which proves that, in line with the
empirical studies by Bertrand and Mullainathan [2], the agent must be rewarded or punished for a
risk that is beyond his control.
Finally, this paper also explicitly characterizes the optimal contract when a possibility for shutdown
risk mitigation exists at a cost. Such a possibility is coherent with agency-free external risk: preven-
tion is not possible, at least on a short-term or medium-term time scale. At best the principal may
be able to invest to mitigate its effects. Crucially we find that in many circumstances, investing is
not optimal for the principal. When it is, it is only optimal up until some cutoff time related to a
balance between the cost of investment, the agent’s rents and possible remaining gain.
The rest of the document is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the
Principal-Agent problems that we consider. In Section 3, we analyse the first-best case where the
principal observes the agent’s effort. Then in Section 4, we give our main results and analysis. In
Section 5, we extend our model to include a possibility for mitigation upon a halt.
2 The Model
The model is inherited from the classical work of Holmström and Milgrom [12]. A principal contracts
with an agent to manage a project she owns. The agent influences the project’s profitability by
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exerting an unobservable effort. For a fixed effort policy, the output process is still random and the
idiosyncratic uncertainty is modeled by a Brownian motion.
We assume that the contract matures at time T > 0 and both principal and agent are risk-averse
with CARA preferences. The departure from the classical model is as follows: we assume the project
is facing some external risk that could partially or totally interrupt the production at some random
time τ . The probability distribution of τ is assumed to be independent of the Brownian motion that
drives the uncertainty of the output process and also independent of the agent’s actions. Finally,
we assume that the contract offers a transfer W at time T from the principal to the agent that is
a functional of the output process.
2.1 Probability setup
Let T > 0 be some fixed time horizon. The key to modeling our Principal-Agent problems under
an agency-free external risk of default is the simultaneous presence over the interval [0, T ] of a
continuous random process and a jump process as well as the ability to extend the standard math-
ematical techniques used for dynamic contracting to this mixed setting. Thus, we shall deal with
two kinds of information : the information from the output process, denoted as F = (Ft)t≥0 and
the information from the default time, i.e. the knowledge of the time where the default occurred
in the past, if the default has appeared. This construction is not new and occurs frequently in
mathematical finance1.
The complete probability space that we consider will be denoted as (Ω,G,P0), with two independent
stochastic processes :
• B a standard one-dimensional F-Brownian motion,
• N the right-continuous single-jump process defined as Nt = 1τ≤t, t in [0, T ] where τ is some
positive random variable independent of B that models the default time.
N will also be referred to as the default indicator process. We therefore use the standard approach
of progressive enlargement of filtration by considering G = {Gt, t ≥ 0} the smallest complete right-
continuous extension of F that makes τ a G-stopping time. Because τ is independent of B, B is a
G-Brownian motion under P0 according to Proposition 1.21 p 11 in [1]. We also suppose that there
exists a bounded deterministic compensator of N , Λt =
∫ t
0
λ(s) ds for some bounded function λ(.)
called the intensity implying that:
Mt = Nt −
∫ t
0
λ(s)(1−Ns)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]
is a G-compensated martingale. Note that through knowledge of the function λ, the principal and
agent can compute at time 0 the probability of default happening over the contracting period [0, T ].
Indeed :
P(τ ≤ T ) = 1− exp(−ΛT ).
We first suppose for computational ease that the intensity λ is a constant. We will see in Section
4.3 that our results may easily be lifted to more general deterministic compensators.
1We refer the curious reader to the two important references [1] and [9].
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Remark 2.1. Here we will suppose that the compensator of N is common knowledge to both the
Principal and the Agent. We could imagine settings where the Principal and Agent’s beliefs regarding
the risk of default may differ : this natural extension of our work would call for analysis of the
dynamic contracting problem under hidden information which is left for future research.
2.2 Principal-Agent Problem
We suppose that the agent agrees to work for the principal over a time period [0, T ] and provide up
to the default time a costly action (at)t∈[0,T ] belonging to A, where A denotes the set of admissible
F-predictable strategies that will be specified later on. The Principal-Agent problem models the
realistic setting where the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort. As such the agent chooses
his action in order to maximize his own utility. The principal must offer a wage based on the
information driven by the output process up to the default time that incentivizes the agent to work
efficiently and contribute positively to the output process. Mathematically, the unobservability of
the agent’s behaviour is modeled through a change of measure. Under P0 , we assume that the
project’s profitability evolves as
Xt := x0 +
∫ t
0
(1−Ns)dBs.
Thus, P0 corresponds to the probability distribution of the profitability when the agent makes no
effort over [0, T ]. When the agent makes an effort a = (at)t, we shall assume that the project’s
profitability evolves as
Xt := x0 +
∫ t
0
as(1−Ns)ds+
∫ t
0
(1−Ns)dBas ,
where Ba is a F-Brownian motion under a measure Pa. The agent fully observes the decomposition
of the production process under a measure Pa whilst the principal only observes the realization of
Xt. In order for the model to be consistent, the probabilities P0 and Pa must be equivalent for all
(at)t∈[0,T∧τ ] belonging to A. Therefore, we introduce the following set of actions
B =
{
a = (at)t : F-predictable and taking values in [−A,A] for some A > 0
}
.
The action process in B are uniformly bounded by some fixed constant A > 0 that will be assumed
as large as necessary. For a ∈ B, we define Pa as
dPa
dP0
|GT = exp
(∫ T
0
as(1−Ns)dBs −
1
2
∫ T
0
|as|2(1−Ns)ds
)
:= LT .
Because E0(LT ) = 1 , (Bat )t∈[0,T ] with Bat = Bt−
∫ t
0
as(1−Ns)ds, t ∈ [0, T ] is a G-Brownian motion
under Pa according to Proposition 3.6 c) p 55 in [1]. It is key to note that if halt occurs, i.e. if
τ ≤ T , then the production process is halted before T meaning that : Xat∧τ = Xat , t ∈ [0, T ]. Let
us then observe that an action a = (at)t of B can be extended to a G-predictable process (ãt)t∈[0,T ]
by setting ãt = at11t≤τ .
The cost of effort for the agent is modeled through a quadratic cost function : κ(a) := κa
2
2 , for
κ > 0 some fixed parameter. As a reward for the agent’s effort, the principal pays him a wage W
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at time T . W is assumed to be a GT∧τ random variable which means that the payment at time T
in case of an early default is known at time τ . The principal and the agent are considered to be
risk averse and risk aversion is modeled through two CARA utility functions :
UP (x) := − exp(−γPx) and UA(x) := − exp(−γAx),
where γP > 0 and γA > 0 are two fixed constants modeling the principal’s and the agent’s risk
aversion.
In this setting and for any given wage W , the agent maximizes his own utility and solves :
V A0 (W ) = sup
a∈B
Ea
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
)]
. (2.1)
A wage W is said to be incentive compatible if there exists an action policy a∗(W ) ∈ B that
maximises (2.1) and thus satisfies
V A0 (W ) = Ea
∗(W )
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(a∗s(W )(1−Ns))ds
)]
.
When the principal is able to offer an incentive compatible wageW , she knows what the agent’s best
reply will be. As such the principal establishes a set A∗(W ) ⊂ B of best replies for the agent for any
incentive compatible W . Therefore, the first task is to characterize the set of incentive-compatible
wages WIC . Only then may the principal consider maximizing his own utility by solving :
sup
W∈WIC
sup
a∗∈A∗(W )
Ea
∗(W )
[
UP
(
X
a∗(W )
T −W
)]
(2.2)
under the participation constraint
Ea
∗(W )
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(a∗s(W )(1−Ns))ds
)]
≥ UA(yPC), (2.3)
where yPC is a monetary reservation utility for the agent.
Remark 2.2. Problem (2.2) has been thoroughly analyzed in a setting where the output process
may not default (see the pioneer papers [12], [20] ). Setting κ = 1 for simplicity, the optimal action
is constant and given by :
a∗ =
γP + 1
γP + γA + 1
,
and the optimal wage is linear in the output:
W = yPC + a
∗XT +
(
γA − 1
2
(a∗)2
)
T.
We may naturally expect to encounter an extension of these results in this setting.
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3 Optimal First-best contracting
We begin with analysis of the first-best benchmark (the full Risk-Sharing problem) which leads to a
simple optimal sharing rule. Of course this problem is not the most realistic when it comes to mod-
eling dynamic contracting situations. However it provides a benchmark to which we can compare
the more realistic Moral Hazard situation. Indeed, the principal’s utility in the full Risk-Sharing
problem is the best that the principal will ever be able to obtain in a contracting situation as he
may observe (and it is thus assumed that he may dictate) the agent’s action.
To write the first-best problem, we assume that both the principal and the agent observe the
variations of the same production process (Xat )t∈[0,T ] under P0:
Xat := x0 +
∫ t
0
as(1−Ns)ds+
∫ t
0
(1−Ns)dBs. t ∈ [0, T ] (3.1)
The agent is guaranteed a minimum value of expected utility through the participation constraint :
E
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
)]
≥ UA(yPC), (3.2)
but has no further say on the wage or action. Consider the admissible set :
APC := {(W,a) such that W is GT∧τ measurable with E [exp(−2γAW )] < +∞, (at)t ∈ B, and (3.2) is satisfied} .
The full Risk-Sharing problem involves maximizing the principal’s utility across APC :
sup
(W,a)∈APC
E [UP (XaT −W )] . (3.3)
3.1 Tackling the Participation Constraint
A first step to optimal contracting in this first-best setting involves answering the following question:
can we characterize the set APC? Following the standard route, we will first establish a necessary
condition. For a given pair (W,a) ∈ APC , let us introduce the agent’s continuation utility (U (W,a)t )t
as follows:
U
(W,a)
t := Et
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
t
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
)]
,
where we use the shorthand notation : Et[.] := E[.|Gt].We may write the Agent’s continuation value
process as the product :
U
(W,a)
t =M
(W,a)
t D
(W,a)
t ,
where :
M(W,a)t := Et
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
)]
and D(W,a)t := exp
(
−γA
∫ t
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
)
.
Observe that for any admissible pair (W,a) ∈ APC , the process M = (M(W,a)t )t is a G-square
integrable martingale. According to the Martingale Representation Theorem for G-martingales
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(see [1], Theorem 3.12 p. 60), there exists some predictable pair (zs, ls) in H2 × H2, where H2 is
the set of F-predictable processes Z with E
[∫ T
0
|Zt|2dt
]
< +∞, such that :
M(W,a)t :=M
(W,a)
0 +
∫ t
0
zs(1−Ns)dBs +
∫ t
0
ls(1−Ns)dMs.
Integration by parts yields the dynamic of U , noting that D has finite variation :
dU
(W,a)
t = −γAκ(at(1−Ns))U
(W,a)
t dt+D
(W,a)
t zt(1−Ns)dBt +D
(W,a)
t lt(1−Ns)dMt.
Setting Z(W,a)t := D
(W,a)
t zt ∈ H2 and K
(W,a)
t := D
(W,a)
t lt ∈ H2, we obtain:
dU
(W,a)
t = −γAκ(at(1−Ns))U
(W,a)
t dt+ Z
(W,a)
t (1−Ns)dBt +K
(W,a)
t (1−Ns)dMt.
By construction, we have that U (W,a)T = UA(W ). It follows that
(
U
(W,a)
t , Z
(W,a)
t ,K
(W,a)
t
)
is a
solution to the BSDE:
−dU (W,a)t = −Z
(W,a)
t (1−Ns)dBt −K
(W,a)
t (1−Ns)dMt + γAκ(at(1−Ns))U
(W,a)
t dt, (3.4)
with U (W,a)T = UA(W ). Therefore, (3.2) is satisfied if and only if U
(W,a)
0 ≥ UA(yPC).
Remark 3.1. Let S2 be the set of G−adapted RCLL processes U such that
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|Ut|2] < +∞.
Through Proposition 2.6 of [7], the solution to (3.4) is unique in (S2×H2×H2). Indeed, the driver
g(ω,U) = γAκ(at(1−Nt))U is uniformly Lipschitz in U because (at)t is bounded and the terminal
condition is in L2.
To sum up, we have the following necessary condition for admissibility.
Lemma 3.1. If (W,a) ∈ APC then there exists a unique solution
(
U
(W,a)
t , Z
(W,a)
t ,K
(W,a)
t
)
in
(S2 ×H2 ×H2) to the BSDE (3.4) such that U (W,a)0 ≥ UA(yPC).
To obtain a sufficient condition, we introduce, for π = (y0, a, β,H) ∈ R × B × H2 × H2, the wage
process (Wπt )t defined as
Wπt := y0 +
∫ t
0
βs(1−Ns)dBs +
∫ t
0
Hs(1−Ns)dMs +
∫ t
0
{γA
2
β2s (1−Ns) + κ(as(1−Ns))
λ
γA
[exp(−γAHs)− 1 + γAHs](1−Ns)
}
ds, (3.5)
and consider the set
Γ :=
{
(y0, a, β,H) ∈ R× B ×H2 ×H2 such that y0 ≥ yPC and E [exp(−2γAWπT )] < +∞.
}
.
We have the following result.
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Lemma 3.2. For any π ∈ Γ, the pair (WπT , a) belongs to APC .
Proof. We apply Itô’s formula to the process Y πt = UA(Wπt ) to obtain
dY πt = −γAY πt βt(1−Nt) dBt + Y πt
(
e−γAHt − 1
)
(1−Nt) dMt − γAκ(at(1−Nt))Y πt dt.
Moreover, because π ∈ Γ, Y πT = UA(WπT ) is square-integrable. Remark 3.1 yields the triplet(
Y πt ,−γAY πt βt, Y πt (e−γAHt − 1)
)
is the unique solution in (S2 × H2 × H2) to BSDE (3.4) with
terminal condition UA(WπT ) when π ∈ Γ. Therefore,
Y π0 = UA(y0) = E
[
UA
(
WπT −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns)) ds
)]
≥ UA(yPC),
and thus (3.2) is satisfied.
Remark 3.2. The admissible contracts are essentially the terminal values of the controlled processes
(3.5) for π ∈ Γ. The difficulty is that we do not know how to characterize the β and H processes
that guarantee that π belongs to Γ. Nevertheless, it is easy to check by a standard application of the
Gronwall lemma that if β and H are bounded then π ∈ Γ. This last observation will prove to be
crucial in the explicit resolution of our problem.
3.2 First-best Dynamic contracting
Using Lemma 3.2, the full Risk-Sharing problem under default writes as the Markovian control
problem :
V FBP := sup
π=(y0,a,Z,K)∈Γ
E
[
UP
(
X
(x0,a)
T −W
π
T
)]
, (3.6)
where X(x0,a)t is given by :
dX(x0,a)s = as(1−Ns)ds+ (1−Ns)dBs,
with X(x0,a)0 = x0 and the wage process is given by :
dWπs = Zs(1−Ns)dBs +Ks(1−Ns)dMs
+
{
γA
2
Z2s (1−Ns) + κ(as(1−Ns)) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAKs)− 1 + γAKs](1−Ns)
}
ds,
with Wπ0 = y0.
We have the following key theorem for the first-best problem.
Theorem 3.1. Let a∗t =
1
κ
, Z∗t =
γP
γP + γA
, and let :
K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
where :
Φ0(t) :=
(
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
) γP+γA
γA
, (3.7)
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with :
c1 :=
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA)
− γP
2κ
− λγP + γA
γA
and c2 := λ
γP + γA
γA
.
Then π∗ = (yPC , a∗, Z∗,K∗) ∈ Γ parameterizes the optimal contract (Wπ
∗
T , a
∗) for the first-best
problem.
The rest of this subsection is dedicated to the proof of this Theorem. We first make the following
observation. As X remains constant after τ , the principal has no further decision to make after the
default time. Thus, its value function is constant and equal to UP (x− y) on the interval [τ, T ].
We now focus on the control part of the problem (i.e. computation of the optimal control triplet
π̃ = (a, Z,K) for a given pair (x0, y0)). To do so, we follow the dynamic programming approach
developed in [17], Section 4 to define the value function
V (0, x0, y0) = sup
π̃∈Γ̃
E
[
UP (X
a
T −W π̃T )(1−NT ) +
∫ T
0
UP (X
a
t −W π̃t )λe−λt dt
]
, (3.8)
where
Γ̃ =
{
π̃ ∈ B ×H2 ×H2
}
,
Because Γ ⊂ R× Γ̃, we have
V FBP ≤ sup
y0≥yPC
V (0, x0, y0).
According to stochastic control theory, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to the
stochastic control problem (3.8) is the following (see [16]):
∂tv(t, x, y) + sup
a,Z,K
{
∂xv(t, x, y)a+ ∂yv(t, x, y)
[
γA
2
Z2 + κ(a) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAK)− 1]
]
+λ [UP (x− y −K)− v0(t, x, y)] + ∂yyv(t, x, y)
Z2
2
+
1
2
∂xxv(t, x, y) + ∂xyv(t, x, y)Z
}
= 0, (3.9)
with the boundary condition :
v(T, x, y) = UP (x− y).
It happens that the HJB equation (3.9) is explicitly solvable by exploiting the separability property
of the exponential utility function.
Lemma 3.3. The function v(t, x, y) = UP (x− y)Φ0(t) with :
Φ0(t) =
(
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
) γP+γA
γA
,
where :
c1 =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA)
− γP
2κ
− λγP + γA
γA
and c2 = λ
γP + γA
γA
,
solves (in the classical sense) the HJB partial differential equation (3.9).
Furthermore a∗t =
1
κ
, Z∗t =
γP
γP + γA
and K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)) are the optimal controls.
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Proof. We search for a solution to Equation (3.9) for a v of the form :
v(t, x, y) = UP (x− y)Φ0(t),
with Φ0 a positive mapping. Such a v satisfies (3.9) if and only if Φ0(t) solves the PDE :
Φ′0(t) + inf
a,Z,K
{
−γPΦ0(t)a+ γPΦ0(t)
(
γA
2
Z2 + κ(a) +
λ
γA
{exp(−γAK)− 1}
)
+γ2PΦ0(t)
Z2
2
+
γ2P
2
Φ0(t)− γ2PΦ0(t)Z + λ (exp(γPK)− Φ0(t))
}
= 0,
with the boundary condition Φ0(T ) = 1. As Φ0 is a positive mapping, the infimum is well defined.
We derive the following first order conditions that must be satisfied by the optimal controls :
γPΦ0(t) = γPκaΦ0(t)
γPΦ0(t)Z(γA + γP ) = γ
2
PΦ0(t)
γPΦ0(t)λ exp(−γAK) = γPλ exp(γPK),
equating to :
a∗ =
1
κ
, Z∗ =
γP
γP + γA
, K∗ =
log(Φ0(t))
γP + γA
.
It follows that :
inf
a,Z,K
{
−γPΦ0(t)a+ γPΦ0(t)
(
γA
2
Z2 + κ(a) +
λ
γA
{exp(−γAK)− 1}
)
+γ2PΦ0(t)
Z2
2
+
γ2P
2
Φ0(t)− γ2PΦ0(t)Z + λ (exp(γPK)− Φ0(t))
}
= −γPΦ0(t)a∗ + γPΦ0(t)
(
γA
2
Z∗2 + κ(a∗) +
λ
γA
{exp(−γAK∗)− 1}
)
+ γ2PΦ0(t)
Z∗2
2
+
γ2P
2
Φ0(t)− γ2PΦ0(t)Z∗ + λ (exp(γPK∗)− Φ0(t))
= Φ0(t)
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms with Z∗
−Φ0(t)
γP
2κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms with a∗
−λγP + γA
γA
Φ0(t) + λ
γP + γA
γA
Φ0(t)
γP
γP+γA .︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms with K∗
We may inject this expression back into the PDE on Φ0. Doing so yields the following Bernoulli
equation :
Φ′0(t) + c1Φ0(t) + c2Φ0(t)
γP
γP+γA = 0, Φ0(T ) = 1,
where
c1 =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA)
− γP
2κ
− λγP + γA
γA
and c2 = λ
γP + γA
γA
.
The unique solution to this equation is (see for instance [22]) :
Φ0(t) =
(
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
) γP+γA
γA
,
and the result follows.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. The value function v(t, x, y) = UP (x− y)Φ0(t) is a classical solution
to the HJB equation (3.9). A standard verification theorem yields that v = V . Through Lemma
3.3, the optimal controls for the full Risk-Sharing problem are :
a∗t =
1
κ
, Z∗t =
γP
γP + γA
and K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
with Φ0 as defined in Lemma 3.3. These controls are free of y and it follows that :
V (0, x0, y0) = E
[
UP
(
X
(x0,a
∗)
T −W
(y0,a
∗,Z∗,K∗)
T
)]
,
is a decreasing function of y0. Thus we obtain
sup
y0≥yPC
V0(0, x0, y0) = E
[
UP
(
X
(x0,a
∗)
T −W
(yPC ,a
∗,Z∗,K∗)
T
)]
.
Finally, we observe that the optimal controls are bounded and thus Remark (3.2) yields π∗ =
(yPC , a
∗, Z∗,K∗) ∈ Γ. As a consequence,
sup
y0≥yPC
V (0, x0, y0) = E
[
UP
(
X
(x0,a)
T −W
(yPC ,a
∗,Z∗,K∗)
T
)]
≤ V FBP .
Because the reverse inequality holds, the final result follows.
4 Optimal contracting under shutdown risk
4.1 Main results
The following is dedicated to our main result for the Moral Hazard problem. We shall state our
main theorem with the explicit optimal contract before turning to some analysis of the effect of the
shutdown on dynamic contracting. In the case of moral hazard, one is forced to make a stronger
assumption about the nature of a contract. This stronger hypothesis will naturally appear to
justify the martingale optimality principle. In our setting, a contract is a GT∧τ measurable random
variable W such that for every β ∈ R, we have
E [exp(βW )] < +∞.
A first step to optimal contracting involves answering the preliminary question: can we characterize
incentive compatible wages and if so what is the related optimal action for the agent? The charac-
terization of incentive compatible contracts relies on the martingale optimality principle (see [13]
and [18]) that we recall below.
Lemma 4.1 (Martingale Optimality Principle). Given a contractW , consider a family of stochastic
processes Ra(W ) := (Rat )t∈[0,T ] indexed by a in B that satisfies :
1. RaT = UA(W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds) for any a in B
2. Ra. is a Pa-supermartingale for any a in B
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3. Ra0 is independent of a.
4. There exists a∗ in B such that Ra∗ is a Pa∗-martingale.
Then,
Ra
∗
0 = Ea
∗
[
UA(W −
∫ T
0
κ(a∗s)ds)
]
≥ Ea
[
UA(W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds)
]
,
meaning that a∗ is the optimal agent’s action in response to the contract W .
We will construct such a family following the standard route. Consider a given contract W , we
define the family Ra(W ) := (Rat )t∈[0,T ] by
Rat := − exp
(
−γA
(
Yt(W )−
∫ t
0
κ(as(1−Ns))ds
))
,
where (Y (W ), Z(W ),K(W )) in (S2×H2×H2) is the unique solution of the following BSDE under
P0
Yt(W ) = W−
∫ T
t
f(Zs(W ),Ks(W ))(1−Ns) ds−
∫ T
t
Zs(W )(1−Ns) dBs−
∫ T
t
Ks(W )(1−Ns) dMs,
(4.1)
with
f(z, k) :=
1
2
γAz
2 + λk +
λ
γA
(e−γAk − 1) + inf
a∈B
{κ(a)− az} .
Remark 4.1. The theoretical justification of the well-posedness of the BSDE (4.1) deserves some
comments. The first results were obtained in [14] and [8] when the contract W is assumed to be
bounded. The necessary extension in our model when W admits an exponential moment has been
treated recently in the paper [15].
By construction, RaT = UA(W −
∫ T
0
κ(as(1 − Ns))ds) for any a in B. Moreover, Ra0 = Y0(W ) is
independent of the agent’s action a. We compute the variations of Ra and obtain :
= −γARasZs(1−Ns)dBs +Ras(e−γAKs − 1)(1−Ns)dMs
+RasγA
{
1
2
γAZ
2
s − f(Zs,Ks) + κ(as(1−Ns)) + λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1)
}
(1−Ns)ds.
= −γARasZs(1−Ns)dBas +Ras(e−γAKs − 1)(1−Ns)dMs
+RasγA
{
1
2
γAZ
2
s − f(Zs,Ks) + κ(as(1−Ns)) + λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1)− asZs
}
(1−Ns)ds.
Thus Ra is a Pa-super-martingale for every a in B, the function
a∗(z) = −A11z≤−κA +
z
κ
11−κA≤z≤κA +A11z≥κA
is a unique minimizer for f and Ra
∗
is a Pa∗ -martingale. As a consequence, every contract W
is incentive compatible which a unique best reply a∗(Z(W )). Finally, a contract W satisfies the
participation constraint if and only if Y0(W ) ≥ yPC .
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Relying on the idea of Sannikov [19] and its recent theoretical justification by Cvitanic, Possamai
and Touzi [6], we will consider the agent promised wage Y (W ) as a state variable to embed the
principal’s problem into the class of Markovian problems, by considering the sensitivities of the
agent’s promised wage Z(W ) and K(W ) as control variables. For π = (y0, Z,K) ∈ [yPC ; +∞) ×
H2 ×H2, we define under P0, the control process called the agent continuation value
W
(y0,Z,K)
t = y0 +
∫ t
0
Zs(1−Ns)dBs +
∫ t
0
Ks(1−Ns)dMs +
∫ t
0
f(Zs,Ks)(1−Ns) ds. (4.2)
Under P∗ := P(a∗(Z)), we thus have
W
(y0,Z,K)
t = y0 +
∫ t
0
Zs(1−Ns)dB∗s +
∫ t
0
Ks(1−Ns)dMs (4.3)
+
∫ t
0
{
γA
2
Z2s + κ(a
∗(Zs)) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAKs)− 1 + γAKs]
}
(1−Ns)ds
= y0 +
∫ t
0
Zs(1−Ns)dB∗s +
∫ t
0
Ks(1−Ns)dNs
+
∫ t
0
{
γA
2
Z2s + κ(a
∗(Zs)) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAKs)− 1]
}
(1−Ns)ds
Now, we consider the set
ζ =
{
π = (Z,K) ∈ H2 ×H2 such that ∀β ∈ R, E
[
exp(βW
(y,Z,K)
T )
]
< +∞ for y ∈ R
}
.
By construction, W (y,π)T is a contract that satisfies the participation constraint for every π ∈ ζ and
y ≥ yPC . Moreover, by the well-posedness of the BSDE (4.1) , every contract W that satisfies
the participation constraint can be written W (Y0(W ),Z(W ),K(W ))T with π(W ) = (Z(W ),K(W )) ∈ ζ.
Therefore, the problem of the principal can now be rewritten as the following optimisation problem
VP := sup
y≥ypc
v(0, x, y),
where
v(0, x, y) = sup
π∈ζ
E∗ [UP (XT∧τ −WπT∧τ )] (4.4)
To characterize the optimal contract, we will proceed analogously as in the full risk sharing case
by constructing a smooth solution to the HJB equation associated to the Markov control problem
(4.4) given by
0 = ∂tv(t, x, y) + inf
Z,K
{
∂xv(t, x, y)
Z
κ
+ ∂yv(t, x, y)
[
γA
2
Z2 + κ(a∗(Z)) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAK)− 1]
]
+λ [UP (x− y −K)− v(t, x, y)] + ∂yyv0(t, x, y)
Z2
2
+
1
2
∂xxv(t, x, y) + ∂xyv(t, x, y)Z
}
,
(4.5)
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Lemma 4.2. Assume the constant A in the definition of the set of admissible efforts B satisfies
A >
γP + κ
−1
κ(γP + γA) + 1
.
Then, the function UP (x− y)Φ0(t), with
Φ0(t) =
(
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
) γP+γA
γA
,
where
c1 =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− γPκ
−1(γP + κ
−1)
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− λγP + γA
γA
and c2 = λ
γP + γA
γA
.
solves in the classical sense the HJB equation (5.3). In particular Z∗t =
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
and K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
Proof. Because the assumption on A implies a∗(z) = z/κ, the proof of this lemma is a direct
adaptation of the proof of Lemma 3.3 to which we refer the reader.
We are in a position to prove the main result of this section
Theorem 4.1. We have the following explicit characterizations of the optimal contracts. Let A as
in the Lemma 4.2 and let Z∗t =
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
and K∗t =
1
γP+γA
log(Φ0(t)), where Φ0 is defined
as in (3.7) with the constants :
c1 :=
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− γPκ
−1(γP + κ
−1)
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− λγP + γA
γA
and c2 := λ
γP + γA
γA
.
Then (yPC , Z∗,K∗) parametrizes the optimal wage for the Moral Hazard problem. The Agent per-
forms the optimal action Z
∗
κ .
Proof. Because the function UP (x−y)Φ0(t) is a classical solution to the HJB equation (5.3) and the
optimal controls are bounded and free of y, we proceed analogously as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Finally, we have to prove that the optimal wage W ∗ = Y (yPC ,Z
∗,K∗)
T admits exponential moments
to close the loop. According to (4.3), we have
W ∗ = yPC+Z
∗B∗T∧τ +
1
2
(
γA +
1
κ
)
(Z∗)2(T ∧τ)+K∗τ−1τ≤T +
∫ T
0
λ
γA
[exp(−γAK∗s )−1](1−Ns)ds.
Because (B∗t )t is a Brownian motion and K∗t is deterministic, it is straightforward to check that
W ∗ admits exponential moments.
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4.2 Model analysis
The optimal contract includes two components. One is linear in the output with an incentivizing
slope that is similar to the classical optimal contract found in [12]. This is necessary to implement
a desirable level of effort. The other is unrelated to the incentives but linked to the shutdown risk
sharing. It is key to observe that this second term is nonzero even if the shutdown risk does not
materialize before the termination of the contract.
The characterization of the optimal contracts in Theorem 4.1 sparks an immediate observation: the
two parties only need to be committed to the contracting agreement up until T ∧ τ . Therefore in
this simple model, using an expected-utility related reasoning and without considering mechanisms
such as employment law, the occurence of the agency-free external risk, halting production, leads
to early contract terminations. This is in line with what actually happened during the Covid
pandemic. Indeed in the USA and in eight weeks of the pandemic, 36.5 million people applied for
unemployment insurance. In more protective economies, mass redundancies were only prevented
through the instauration of furlough type schemes allowing private employees’ wages to temporarily
be paid by gouvernements. This phenomena makes fundamental sense : a principal whose output
process is completely halted cannot enforce the agent to work hard because she has no revenue to
provide the incentives. Let’s focus on the second term:
K∗τ−1τ≤T +
∫ T
0
λ
γA
[exp(−γAK∗s )− 1](1−Ns)ds, (4.6)
Understanding the effect of these extra terms is crucial to fully understand the sharing of the
agency-free shutdown risk. First, we show that the sign of the control K∗ is constant.
Lemma 4.3. Let c1 and c2 be the relevant constants given in Theorem 4.1 then the optimal control
(K∗t )t∈[0,T ] can be expressed as :
K∗t =
1
γA
log
(
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)((T − t) ∧ τ)
)])
t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.7)
Proof. We have that :
K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
with
Φ0(t) =
(
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
) γP+γA
γA
.
The aim here is to link this expression for Φ0 to that of an expected value. As such, we consider
the following expected value that decomposes as shown :
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)((T − t) ∧ τ)
)]
= E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)(T − t)
)
1τ>T−t
]
+ E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)τ
)
1τ≤T−t
]
.
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Using c2 =
γP + γA
γA
λ, the first term of the expected value rewrites as follows :
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)(T − t)
)
1τ>T−t
]
= exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)(T − t)
)
exp (−λ(T − t))
= exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
.
It remains to compute the second term. We obtain :
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)τ
)
1τ≤T−t
]
=
∫ T−t
0
λ exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)s
)
exp (−λs) ds
=
∫ T−t
0
λ exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)s− λs
)
ds
=
∫ T−t
0
λ exp
(
γA
γP + γA
c1s
)
ds
=
[
λ
c1
γP + γA
γA
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
c1s
)]T−t
0
=
[
c2
c1
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
c1s
)]T−t
0
=
c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
.
Combining both terms we reach the final expression :
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)((T − t) ∧ τ)
)]
=
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
.
Therefore we identify that :
Φ0(t) =
(
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)((T − t) ∧ τ)
)]) γP+γA
γA
.
As a consequence, we may also rewrite K∗t . Indeed :
K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
and with the new expression for Φ0 we obtain the result :
K∗t =
1
γA
log
(
E
[
exp
(
γA
γP + γA
(c1 + c2)((T − t) ∧ τ)
)])
.
Remark 4.2. We have the same expression for the optimal control K∗ in the first-best case, using
for c1 and c2 the relevant constants given in Theorem 3.1.
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As a consequence, this alternative form for K∗ leads to easy analysis of the sign of the control,
given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. The sign of K∗ over the contracting period [0, T ] is constant and entirely determined
by the model’s risk aversions γP and γA, and the Agent’s effort cost κ. Indeed, the sign of K∗
is equal to the sign of γP γA − γPκ−1 − (κ−1)2. Moreover, K∗t varies monotonously in time, with
K∗T = 0.
Proof. From the expression (4.7), we easily deduce that :
• If c1 + c2 = 0 then K∗t = 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ],
• if c1 + c2 > 0 then K∗t > 0 for t ≤ τ and the function t→ K∗t decreases,
• if c1 + c2 < 0 then K∗t < 0 for t ≤ τ and the function t→ K∗t increases.
Replacing c1 and c2 by their relevant expressions in each case leads to the result.
Finally, we will show that the risk-sharing component of the contract is in fact linear with respect
to the default time. This is a strong result of our study for which we had no ex-ante intuition.
Corollary 4.1. The shutdown risk-sharing component of the optimal wage is linear in the default
time. More precisely, the optimal wage is
W ∗ = yPC + Z
∗B∗T∧τ +
1
2
(
γA +
1
κ
)
(Z∗)2(T ∧ τ) +K∗0 −
(
c1
γP + γA
+
λ
γA
)
(T ∧ τ).
Proof. Because K∗T = 0, the optimal wage can be written
W ∗ = yPC + Z
∗B∗T∧τ +
1
2
(
γA +
1
κ
)
(Z∗)2(T ∧ τ) + f(T ∧ τ),
with
f(t) = K∗t +
∫ t
0
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗s )− 1) ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let us define
g(t) =
c1 + c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
c1
.
We have g′(t) = −(c1 + c2) γAγP+γA exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
.
Therefore,
∂
∂t
K∗t =
1
γA
g′(t)
g(t)
=
1
γP + γA
−(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
c1+c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
− c2c1

=
c1
γP + γA
 −(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
 .
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Also
∂
∂t
∫ t
0
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗s )− 1) ds =
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗t )− 1)
and so :
∂
∂t
∫ t
0
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗s )− 1) ds =
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗t )− 1)
=
λ
γA
(
1
g(t)
− 1
)
well-defined as g(t) > 0 on [0, T ]
=
λ
γA
 1c1+c2
c1
exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
− c2c1
− 1

=
c1λ
γA
 1(c1 + c2) exp(c1 γAγP+γA (T − t))− c2
− λγA
Finally, we have :
f ′(t) =
∂
∂t
K∗t +
∂
∂t
∫ t
0
λ
γA
(exp(−γAK∗s )− 1) ds
=
c1
γP + γA
 −(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
− c2

+
c1λ
γA
 1(c1 + c2) exp(c1 γAγP+γA (T − t))− c2
− λγA
=
−c1
γP + γA
1
(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP+γA
(T − t)
)
− c2
{
(c1 + c2) exp
(
c1
γA
γP + γA
(T − t)
)
− λ γA
γP + γA
}
− λ
γA
= − c1
γP + γA
− λ
γA
as c2 =
λγA
γP + γA
= −
(
c1
γP + γA
+
λ
γA
)
.
We may note that the default related part of the wage paid under full-Risk-Sharing also writes
under this form, where we take the relevant values for K∗0 , c1 and c2.
Remark 4.3. A little algebra gives
f(t) = K∗0 −
(
c1
γP + γA
+
λ
γA
)
t = K∗0 −
(c1 + c2) t
γP + γA
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The slope of f is of opposite sign to the sign of c1 + c2. As a consequence,
• If c1 + c2 = 0 then f(t) = 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ],
• if c1 + c2 > 0 then f(0) = K∗0 > 0 for t ≤ τ and the function t→ f(t) decreases,
• if c1 + c2 < 0 then f(0) = K∗0 < 0 for t ≤ τ and the function t→ f(t) increases.
K∗0 > 0 is the extra compensation asked at the signature of the contract by an agent who is more
sensitive to the shutdown risk than the principal. We can easily visualize the sign of the control K∗0
as a function of γP , γA and κ. Below we plot the sign depending on the risk-aversions and fixing
κ = 1 and κ = 2. The first two plots (Figure 9 and 2) correspond to the full Risk-Sharing case
whilst Figures 3 and 4 show the sign of K∗ in the Moral Hazard case. The x-axis holds the values
of γA and the y-axis the values of γP . Both risk-aversion constants are valued between 0 and 10
and the origin is in the bottom left corner. Blue encodes a negative sign and green a positive sign.
Figure 1: Sign of K∗0 depending
on γP and γA for κ = 1.
Figure 2: Sign of K∗0 depending
on γP and γA for κ = 2.
Figure 3: Sign of K∗0 depending
on γP and γA for κ = 1.
Figure 4: Sign of K∗0 depending
on γP and γA for κ = 2.
We observe that in most situations, the sign of K∗0 is positive. A negative sign occurs when either
the principal or the agent are close to being risk-neutral (symmetrically so in the full Risk-Sharing
case but asymmetrically so in the Moral Hazard case : the sign switches from negative to positive
at a much lower level of risk-aversion for the principal than the agent). Also note that increasing
the agent’s effort coefficient κ decreases the level of risk-aversion for which K∗0 goes from positive
to negative. Note that it is known by both the Principal and the Agent at time 0 whether the
20
contract will fall into either regime.
Our key result shows that the risk of shutdown adds an extra linear term to the optimal compen-
sation that, up to the underlying constants, has the same structure under both full Risk Sharing
and under Moral Hazard. Even if the optimal contract separates the role of incentives from that of
shutdown risk sharing, the amount of the insurance deposit K∗0 depends strongly on the magnitude
of the moral hazard problem. Therefore, we may naturally quantify the effect of Moral Hazard on
the risk-sharing part. With this question in mind we compare the values of K∗0 under Risk-Sharing
and Moral Hazard for different parameter values. This may be observed in the Figures 5 to 9
below where we represent the values of K∗0 under Moral Hazard (red) and Risk-Sharing (blue) as a
function of one of the underlying parameters (γP , γA, λ, κ, T ) whilst fixing the remaining 4.
These figures lead to a crucial observation : under any given set of parameters, the value of K∗0
under Moral Hazard is always greater than the value of K∗0 under Risk Sharing. Note that in some
settings, given some parameters the signs of the two cases are not always the same as the sign is
that of c1 + c2 which depends on the values of γP , γA and κ in a different manner in Risk-Sharing
and Moral Hazard. Of course though, as soon as K∗0 for Risk-Sharing is positive, K∗0 for Moral
Hazard is positive too. We may note that although λ and T do not impact the sign, variations in
their values have an impact on the magnitude |K∗0 | : the higher the risk of early termination of the
contract, the lower the amount of insurance requested by the agent and the longer the duration of
the contract, the higher the amount of insurance requested by the agent.
Figure 5: Values of K∗0 depending on γP
γA = 0.5, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1 γA = 1.5, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1 γA = 5, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1
Figure 6: Values of K∗0 depending on γA
γP = 0.5, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1 γP = 1, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1 γP = 3, λ = 1, κ = 1, T = 1
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Figure 7: Values of K∗0 depending on λ
γP = 4, γA = 4, κ = 1, T = 1 γP = 1, γA = 1, κ = 1, T = 1
Figure 8: Values of K∗0 depending on κ
γP = 1, γA = 1, λ = 1, T = 1 γP = 1, γA = 3, λ = 1, T = 1 γP = 3, γA = 3, λ = 1, T = 1
Figure 9: Values of K∗0 depending on T
γP = 1, γA = 1, λ = 1, κ = 1 γP = 1, γA = 3, λ = 1, κ = 1 γP = 3, γA = 3, λ = 1, κ = 1
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Additionally, the parameter λ does have a quantifiable effect of the wage as it affects its expected
value :
E(f(T ∧ τ)) = K∗0 −
c1 + c2
γP + γA
(
1− e−λT
T
)
.
This expected value is represented below as a function of γA and γP for different values of λ (with
T = 1 and κ = 1 fixed). The first three figures (Figures 10, 11 and 12 ) concern the full Risk-Sharing
case whilst the second set of figures (Figures 13, 14 and 15) concern the Moral Hazard setting.
Figure 10: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
0.5.
Figure 11: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
1.
Figure 12: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
5.
Figure 13: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
0.5.
Figure 14: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
1.
Figure 15: Expected value de-
pending on γP and γA for λ =
5.
The value seems to be in many cases very close to 0. As such, the agent earns, on average, a
very similar wage to a "stopped" Holmstrom-Milgrom wage. However when the principal and the
agent are particularly risk-averse, the expected value increases quite notably and the agent gains
slightly more on average. This is in line with the papers by Hoffman and Pfeil [11] and Bertrand
and Mullainathan [2] which show the agent must be rewarded for a risk that is beyond his control.
Note that the simulations show that for fixed levels of risk-aversion the expected value increases
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as λ increases. For example for γP = γA = 7, in Figure 13 the expected value is approximately
worth 0.075 and in Figure 14 it is approximately equal to 0.15. As such the risk-averse agent is
increasingly rewarded for the uncontrollable risk.
Finally, we can make a few further comments related to the underlying expected utilities in this
new contracting setting. First, the agent’s expected utility is the same under both full Risk-Sharing
and Moral Hazard. Indeed he walks away with his participation constraint :
E
[
UA
(
W ∗ −
∫ T
0
κ(a∗s)ds
)]
= UA(yPC),
where (W ∗, a∗) designates the Risk-Sharing or Moral Hazard optimal contract under shutdown
risk. Such a result also holds in the same setting without shutdown risk : the agent tracts average
the same expected utility under full Risk-Sharing or Moral Hazard, with or without an underlying
agency-free external risk.
When it comes to the principal we may wonder how his expected utility may be affected by the
possibility of a halt in production. In particular we may question what the principal loses in
not being able to observe the agent’s action under a likelihood of agency-free external risk ? To
answer this we denote as V RS0 (0, x, y) the Principal’s expected utility under full Risk-Sharing and
VMH0 (0, x, y) under Moral Hazard. We have that :
V RS0 (0, x, y) = UP (x− y)ΦRS0 (0) and VMH0 (0, x, y) = UP (x− y)ΦMH0 (0)
where ΦRS0 and ΦMH0 are the related functions from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1. With these
expressions we have that :
VMH0 (0, x, y)
V RS0 (0, x, y)
=
ΦMH0 (0)
ΦRS0 (0)
.
The Moral Hazard problem involves optimizing across a more restricted set of contracts. Therefore
we know that :
VMH0 (0, x, y) ≤ V RS0 (0, x, y),
and as UP (x− y) < 0 :
ΦRS0 (0) ≤ ΦMH0 (0).
We may question whether this inequality leads to a big gap between the expected utilities and we
answer this by plotting the ratio Φ
MH
0 (0)
ΦRS0 (0)
for different values of λ and with T = 1 and κ = 1 fixed.
We first observe a standard result : for low levels of risk-aversion the ratio is close to 1 and the
principal does not lose much by not observing the agent’s actions. As the values of risk-aversion
increase the principal loses out more and more by not being in a first best setting. This classical
result comes with an observation that is specific to the presence of shutdown risk : as λ increases
(and therefore as the chance of shutdown risk occurring before T increases), the ratio stays close
to 1 for higher and higher levels of risk-aversion. For example in Figure 16 when γP = γA = 6
we observe that Φ
MH
0 (0)
ΦRS0 (0)
≈ 2 yet in Figure 18 for the same levels of risk-aversion we have that
ΦMH0 (0)
ΦRS0 (0)
≈ 1. So a high possibility of some production halt occurring reduces the gap between the
full Risk-Sharing contract and the Moral Hazard contract. Such a phenomena may be due to the
fact that a high possibility of a production halt at some point in the time interval means that the
wage process evolves on a time period that is on average shorter before stopping. There is thus less
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Figure 16: Ratio depending on
γP and γA for λ = 0.5.
Figure 17: Ratio depending on
γP and γA for λ = 1.
Figure 18: Ratio depending on
γP and γA for λ = 5.
time for a significant gap to appear between the full Risk-Sharing case and the Moral Hazard case.
As this analysis comes to a close we finish this section by discussing a possibility for extension with
more general deterministic compensators.
4.3 General deterministic compensators (Λt)t∈[0,T ]
Throughout this paper, we have considered a constant compensator λ for the jump process. This
choice allows for clearer calculations but it is key to note that our results extend to the case where
λ is no longer constant such as :
Λt =
∫ t
0
λsds,
with (λs)s∈[0,T ] some deterministic positive mapping such that ΛT < +∞. The proofs for the
optimal contracting are simply a direct extension of the proofs of the previous sections. Of course
due to the independence between B and N , a time dependent compensator does not induce any
change to the Holmstrom-Milgrom part of the wages. Only the part related to K∗ is affected. We
provide the details in the following.
The full Risk-Sharing problem
The optimal wage for the Risk-Sharing problem in such a setting is of the form :
Wt = y
∗ +
∫ t
0
Z∗s (1−Ns)dBs +
∫ t
0
K∗s (1−Ns)dMs
+
∫ t
0
{
γA
2
Z∗s
2 + κ(a∗s(1−Ns)) +
λs
γA
[exp(−γAK∗s )− 1 + γAK∗s ]
}
(1−Ns)ds,
where :
y∗ = yPC , a
∗
t =
1
κ
, Z∗t =
γP
γP + γA
and K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
with Φ0(t) solution to the Bernouilli equation :
25
Φ′0(t) + c1(t)Φ0(t) + c2(t)Φ0(t)
γP
γP+γA = 0, Φ0(T ) = 1,
where
c1(t) =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA)
− γP
2κ
− λt
γP + γA
γA
and c2(t) = λt
γP + γA
γA
.
The Moral Hazard problem
The optimal wage in the Moral-Hazard problem is again of the form :
Wt = y
∗+
∫ t
0
Z∗s (1−Ns)dB∗s+
∫ t
0
K∗s (1−Ns)dMs+
∫ t
0
{
1
2
γAZ
∗
s
2 − Z
∗
s
2
2κ
+ λsK
∗
s +
λs
γA
(e−γAK
∗
s − 1)
}
(1−Ns)ds,
where :
y∗ = yPC , Z
∗
t =
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
and K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log(Φ0(t)),
with Φ0(t) solution to the Bernouilli equation :
Φ′0(t) + c1(t)Φ0(t) + c2(t)Φ0(t)
γP
γP+γA = 0, Φ0(T ) = 1,
with :
c1(t) =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− γPκ
−1(γP + κ
−1)
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− λt
γP + γA
γA
and c2(t) = λt
γP + γA
γA
.
5 Mitigating the effects of agency-free external risk
This paper has so far modeled the occurence of a halt as a complete fatality suffered by both
parties in the contracting agreement. Yet the recent crisis has highlighted the ability of humans
and businesses to react and adapt when faced with adversity. We now include such phenomena in
the contracting setting by allowing the principal to invest upon a halt in order to continue some form
of (possibly disrupted) production. This is quite a natural and realistic variant on our initial model.
Indeed when faced with a period of lockdown, companies may for example invest in teleworking
infrastructure so that a number of employees whose jobs are doable remotely can continue to work.
Similarly, jobs that require some form of presence could continue if companies invest in protective
equipment and adapt their organization. We may wonder how such a mechanism may affect optimal
contracting.
5.1 Setting for mitigation
Mathematically, we consider that the production process evolves as previously up until τ ∧ T . If
a halt happens at some time τ ≤ T , we allow the principal to invest an amount i > 0 to continue
production at a degraded level θ ∈ (0, 1). It is assumed that the investment decision is at the
principal’s convenience. It is modeled by a control D which is a Gτ -measurable random variable
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with values in {0, 1}. The θ parameter is firm-specific and reflects the effectiveness of the post-
shutdown reorganization.
Under the initial probability measure P0, the output process Xt evolves as
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
((1−Ns) +Ns11D=1) dBs.
We recall from [10] Lemma 4.4. the decomposition of a G-adapted process φ. There exist a F-
adapted process φ0 and a family of processes (φ1t (u), u ≤ t ≤ T ) that are Ft ⊗ B(R+) measurable
such that
φt = φ
0
t11t<τ + φ
1
t (τ)11t≥τ .
Contract: A contract W is a GT -measurable random variable satisfying E(exp(−2γAW )) < +∞ of
the form
W = W 011T<τ + (W
1,1
T (τ)11D=1 +W
1,0
T (τ)11D=0)11τ≤T .
where W 0 is FT -mesurable and W 1,1t (u) and W
1,0
t (u) are Ft ⊗ B(R+) measurable. We will assume
that W 1,0T (τ) = W
1,0
T∧τ (τ) since in the absence of investment, it is no longer necessary to give incen-
tives after τ .
Effort process: In this setting, the agent will adapt his effort to the occurence of the shutdown risk.
This is mathematically modeled by a G-adapted process (at)t in the form
at = a
0
t11t<τ + a
1
t (τ)11t≥τ
where a0 and a1 are respectively F-adapted and Ft ⊗ B(R+) measurable. Furthermore, we assume
that the effort processes are bounded by some constant A. We then define Pa as dP
a
dP0 |GT = L
θ
T , with
LθT = exp
(∫ T
0
a0s(1−Ns) + θa1s(τ)Ns11D=1dBs −
1
2
∫ T
0
(a0s)
2(1−Ns) + θ2(a1s(τ))2Ns11D=1ds
)
Because the processes a0 and a1 are bounded, (Bat )t∈[0,T ] with
Bat = Bt −
∫ t
0
(a0s(1−Ns) + θa1s(τ)Ns11D=1) ds, t ∈ [0, T ]
is a G-Brownian motion under Pa. Under Pa, the output process evolves as
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
(a0s(1−Ns) + θa1s(τ)Ns11D=1) ds+
∫ t
0
((1−Ns) +Ns11D=1) dBs.
5.2 The Optimal contract
We first make the following observation. After τ , if the default time occurs before the maturity of
the contract, the principal has a binary decision to take. If she decides to not invest, she gets the
value V 1,0(x, y) = UP (x − y) where x is the level of input and y is the agent continuation value.
On the other hand, if she decides to invest, she will face for t ≥ τ the moral hazard problem of
Holmstrom and Milgrom for which we know the optimal contract and the associated value function
V 1,1(t, x, y) = UP (x− y)Φ1(t, θ)
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where Φ1(t, θ) = exp(−γPCinv(T − t)) and Cinv :=
(
γP +
θ2
κ
)2
2
(
γP + γA +
θ2
κ
) − γP2 .
Because the principal has to pay a sunk cost i > 0 to invest, she will decide optimally to invest if
and only if at τ for a given (x, y), she observes
V 1,1(τ, x, y) ≥ V 1,0(x, y),
or equivalently Cinv(T − τ) > i. Hence, if Cinv > 0, the optimal control will be D∗ = 1 {τ<T− iCinv }.
To sum up, we have
Lemma 5.1. 1. Investment for mitigation is never optimal upon a halt if :
Cinv < 0 or i > TCinv.
2. Now suppose that :
Cinv > 0 and i < TCinv.
Mitigation is optimal up until the cutoff time tmax defined as :
tmax := T −
i
Cinv
.
Note that i < TCinv guarantees that tmax ≥ 0.
We are in a position to solve the before-default principal problem. Proceeding analogously as in
Section 4, the before-default value function is given by the Markovian control problem
VP = sup
y≥yPC
V0(0, x, y),
with
V (0, x0, y0) = sup
π=(Z,K)∈ζ
E
[
UP (X
π
T −WπT )(1−NT ) +
∫ T
0
max(V 1,0(Xπt ,W
π
t ), V
1,1(t,Xπt ,W
π
t ))λe
−λt dt
]
,
(5.1)
and
dXt = a
∗(Zt)(1−Nt) dt+ (1−Nt) dB∗t ,
dWπt = Zs(1−Ns)dB∗s +Ks(1−Ns)dMs (5.2)
+
{
γA
2
Z2s + κ(a
∗(Zs)) +
λ
γA
[exp(−γAKs)− 1 + γAKs]
}
(1−Ns)ds.
Remark 5.1. To be perfectly complete, we develop in the appendix the martingale optimality prin-
ciple which makes it possible to obtain the dynamics (5.2).
Theorem 5.1. We have the following explicit characterizations of the optimal contracts. Assume
the constant A in the definition of the set of admissible efforts B satisfies
A >
γP + κ
−1
κ(γP + γA) + 1
.
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Let Z∗t =
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
and
K∗t =
1
γP + γA
log
 Φ0(t)
min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
}

with Φ0 as defined above with :
c1 :=
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− γPκ
−1(γP + κ
−1)
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− λγP + γA
γA
and
c2(t) = λ
γP + γA
γA
min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
} γA
γP+γA
Then (yPC , Z∗,K∗) parametrizes the optimal wage for the Moral Hazard problem with a possibility
for mitigation. The Agent performs the optimal action
Z∗
κ
before τ and
θZ∗
κ
after τ when τ <
T − i/Cinv.
Proof. The reasoning used to compute the optimal Moral Hazard contract very much parallels the
reasoning used above in Section 4. As a consequence, we are much more brief in the following proof.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to the value function V0 is the following :
0 = ∂tv0(t, x, y) + inf
Z,K
{
∂xv0(t, x, y)
Z
κ
+ ∂yv0(t, x, y)
[
γA
2
Z2 +
Z2
2κ
+
λ
γA
[exp(−γAK)− 1]
]
+λ [v1(t, x, y +K)− v0(t, x, y)] + ∂yyv0(t, x, y)
Z2
2
+
1
2
∂xxv0(t, x, y) + ∂xyv0(t, x, y)Z
}
, (5.3)
with the boundary condition :
v0(T, x, y) = UP (x− y)
where
v1(t, x, y) = UP (x− y) min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
}
.
Lemma 5.2. Assume A >
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
. The function v0(t, x, y) = UP (x− y)Φ0(t), with
Φ0(t) := exp(−c1t)
{
exp(c1
γA
γP + γA
T ) +
γA
γP + γA
∫ T
t
c2(s) exp(
γA
γP + γA
c1s)ds
} γP+γA
A
where
c1 =
γ2P γA
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− γPκ
−1(γP + κ
−1)
2(γP + γA + κ−1)
− λγP + γA
γA
and
c2(t) = λ
γP + γA
γA
min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
} γA
γP+γA .
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solves in the classical sense the HJB equation (5.3). In particular Z∗t =
γP + κ
−1
γP + γA + κ−1
and K∗t =
1
γP+γA
log
 Φ0(t)
min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
}
.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is a direct adaptation of the proof of Lemma 4.2 to which we refer
the reader.
The proof of the final result relies on the regularity of v0 and a standard verification result. Because
the controls are free of y, we deduce that VP = V0(0, x, yPC).
The main change brought about by investment involves the halt related control K∗. Indeed the
optimal Z∗ in the Moral Hazard case are simply the optimal "Holmström-Milgrom" controls for the
related production process. At first glance, the optimal control K∗ seems to be quite different from
that of Theorem 4.1. However one may verify that when we are in a setting where investment is
never optimal (through the criteria of Lemma 5.1), the expression for K∗ simplifies to exactly that
of Theorem 4.1. The key to deduce this is that in such a setting, min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
}
= 1.
We may therefore focus our analysis on the effects on investment when investing may be optimal
(i.e. when Cinv > 0 and i < TCinv). In such a setting, K∗ has two phases :
- before tmax, K∗ is adjusted to account for the possibility of risk mitigation
- after tmax, K∗ has the same values as without mitigation. Indeed :
min
{
1, exp(γP i)Φ1(t, θ)
}
= 1 for t ≥ tmax.
We are able to analyze the effect of different parameters and to do so represent the deterministic
part of K∗ as a function of time in the following figures.
We fix parameters γP = κ = T = 1, γA = 0.5 : again this allows for mitigation to be optimal before
some tmax.
Figure 19: λ = 0.5, i = 0.1,
θ = 0.9
Figure 20: λ = 1, i = 0.1, θ =
0.9.
Figure 21: λ = 5, i = 0.1, θ =
0.9.
We immediately observe that with mitigation, the value of K∗ before tmax and is higher than
without mitigation : the possibility for mitigation shrinks the opportunities for speculation (see
Figures 19 to 21) and increasingly so as the probability of a halt increases. In fact the sign of K∗
may now change over the duration of the contracting period : see Figure 21. Quite naturally, tmax
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Figure 22: i = 0.05, λ = 1,
θ = 0.9
Figure 23: i = 0.1, λ = 1, θ =
0.9 .
Figure 24: i = 0.15, λ = 1,
θ = 0.9 .
Figure 25: i = 0.1, λ = 1, θ =
0.85
Figure 26: i = 0.1, λ = 1, θ =
0.9 .
varies with θ and i. Indeed it decreases as i increases or θ decreases : as the cost of investment
increases and/or the level of degradation in continued production increases, more time is needed
for investment for continued production to be worth it.
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6 Appendix
We sketch the martingale optimality principle arising from the Agent’s problem in the investment
setting. We set H2G is the set of G− adapted processes Z with E[
∫ T
0
Z2sds] < +∞ and S2G is the set
of G−predictable processes Y with cadlag paths such that Z with E[supt∈[0,T ] Y 2t ] < +∞. For a
Gτ−measurable random variable D with values in {0, 1} that models the investment decision, we
consider a contract W as a GT measurable r.v. which can be decomposed under the form :
W = W 01T<τ +
(
W 1,1T (τ)1D=1 +W
1,0
T (τ)1D=0
)
1τ≤T ,
whereW 0 is FT -measurable, andW 1,1t (u) andW
1,0
t (u) are Ft⊗B(R+) measurable, with in particular
W 1,0T (τ) = W
1,0
T∧τ (τ). Given a contract W , the agent faces the following control problem,
sup
a∈B
EP
a
E
[
UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(as)ds
)]
.
Remember that an effort process is now a G−adapted process (at)t∈[0,T ] and consequently has the
form :
at = a
0
t1t<τ + a
1
t (τ)1t≥τ
where a0 is F−adapted and a1 is Ft ⊗B(R+) measurable and where both are assumed bounded by
some constant A. By convention, we still denote by B the set of such effort.
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that there exists some unique triplet (Y,Z,K) in S2G ×H2G ×H2G such that :
Yt = W −
∫ T
t
Zs((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)dBs −
∫ T
t
Ks(1−Ns)dMs −
∫ T
t
f(s, Zs,Ks)ds,
where
f(s, Zs,Ks) =
(
λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1)
)
(1−Ns)
+
1
2
γAZ
2
s ((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1) + inf
a∈B
{κ(as)− asZs(1−Ns)− θasZs1τ≤s,D=1} ,
then
Rat = UA
(
Yt −
∫ t
0
κ(as)ds
)
satisfies a Martingale Optimality Principle for the Agent’s problem in this setting.
Proof. By construction, RaT = UA
(
W −
∫ T
0
κ(as)ds
)
and Ra0 is independent of the Agent’s action
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a. As in Section 4, we compute the variations of Ra to obtain:
dRas = −γARasZs((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)dBas +Ras(e−γAKs − 1)(1−Ns)dMs
+RasγA
(
1
2
γAZ
2
s ((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)− f(s, Zs,Ks) + κ(as) + (λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1))(1−Ns)
)
+RasγA (−asZs(1−Ns) + θasNs1D=1)
= −γARasZs((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)dBas +Ras(e−γAKs − 1)(1−Ns)dMs
+RasγA
(
1
2
γAZ
2
s ((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)− f(s, Zs,Ks) + κ(a0s(1−Ns)) + κ(θa1sNs1D=1) + (λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1))(1−Ns)
)
+RasγA
(
−a0sZs(1−Ns) + θa1sNs1D=1
)
and therefore Ra is a super-martingale for every a in B. Setting :
a0s
∗
(z) = −A1 z
κ<−A +A1 zκ>A +
z
κ
1−A≤ zκ≤A
and
a1s
∗
(z) = −A1 θz
κ ≤−A
+A1 θz
κ >A
+
θz
κ
1−A≤ θzκ ≤A,
then
a∗t = a
0
t
∗1t<τ + a1t
∗1t≥τ .
We get that Ra∗ is a Pa∗ -martingale and the Agent’s response given W is then a∗.
It remains to show that there actually exists a unique solution to (Y,Z,K) in S2G ×H2G ×H2G to :
Yt = W −
∫ T
t
Zs((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)dBs −
∫ T
t
Ks(1−Ns)dMs −
∫ T
t
f(s, Zs,Ks)ds,
where
f(s, Zs,Ks) =
(
λKs +
λ
γA
(e−γAKs − 1)
)
(1−Ns)
+
1
2
γAZ
2
s ((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1) + inf
a∈B
{κ(as)− asZs(1−Ns)− θasZs1τ≤s,D=1} .
To to this, first note for any s in [0, T ] fixed, and for any t ∈ [s, T ] there exists a unique pair
(Y i, Zi) ∈ S2G ×H2G solution to the BSDE :
Y it (s) = W
1,1
T (s)1D=1 −
∫ T
t
f1(Zis(s))ds−
∫ T
t
Zis(s)dBs, (6.1)
where f1(z) = 12γAz
2+infa∈B(κ(a)−θaz) and where the notation (Y i(s), Zi(s)) is used to emphasize
the dependency in s of the terminal condition and its effect on the solution. This existence result
simply follows from the fact that for each s, (6.1) is now simply a Brownian BSDE that fits into
the classical quadratic setting of Briand and Hu. We may then set :
W̃ = Y iτ (τ)1τ≤T1D=1 +W
1,0
T∧τ (τ)1τ≤T1D=0 +W
01T<τ ,
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which is a GT∧τ measurable random-variable. We set :
f2(z, k) =
1
2
γAz
2 + λk +
λ
γA
(e−γAk − 1) + inf
a∈B
(κ(a)− aZ) .
This fits right into the setting of the recent work [15] on a default BSDE for Principal Agent
problems. In particular, there exists a unique triplet (Ỹ , Z̃, K̃) in S2G ×H2G ×H2G such that :
Ỹt = W̃ −
∫ T∧τ
t∧τ
Z̃sdBs −
∫ T∧τ
t∧τ
K̃sdMs −
∫ T∧τ
t∧τ
f2(Z̃s, K̃s)ds.
Finally, setting :
• Yt = Ỹt(1−Nt) + Y it (τ)Nt1D=1
• Zt = Z̃t(1−Nt) + Zit(τ)Nt1D=1
• Kt = K̃t(1−Nt)
and noting that :
f(s, z, k) = f1(z)Ns1D=1 + f2(z, k)(1−Ns),
we obtain that (Y, Z,K) is a solution to :
Yt = W −
∫ T
t
Zs((1−Ns) +Ns1D=1)dBs −
∫ T
t
Ks(1−Ns)dMs −
∫ T
t
f(s, Zs,Ks)ds. (6.2)
Finally, uniqueness holds through a classical reasoning, noting that up to a change in probability,
Y is a local martingale that has continuous paths on a certain left-hand neighbourhood of T .
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